



**Director of
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
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POLAND: Central Committee Meeting Called

Yesterday's announcement that the Polish party Central Committee will meet "shortly" is an effort by the regime to put more pressure on the Solidarity congress to moderate its decisions. []

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The announcement is also designed to show Moscow that the regime is taking a tough course. Party leader Kania and other moderates will probably be able to deflect pressure from hardliners for more forceful actions by arguing that the congress' direction is not yet clear. The hardliners probably have the support of Moscow, which last week implicitly called for convening a Central Committee meeting to oust Kania. []

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Militants' Pressure on Walesa

Walesa remains the strong favorite to win reelection, but militant elements in Solidarity want to curb his autocratic tendencies and ensure themselves a greater role in decisionmaking. Militants yesterday approved a resolution that sharply reprimanded Walesa and a small group of leaders for going over the union's head in reaching a compromise with the government on the worker self-management law. []

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The resolution also criticized Walesa's advisers--who are largely political dissidents and Catholic intellectuals--as too ready to compromise. The congress has not yet taken a position, however, on the self-management agreement itself. []

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Walesa's critics apparently have struck a responsive chord among the rank and file with their claim that the current leadership is "too political." They risk having their campaign backfire, however, if they press too hard and appear too ambitious for power. []

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The delegates, meanwhile, are involving themselves in political areas that will provoke angry criticism from the regime and the Soviets. The union's draft program, released yesterday, apparently contains several politically sensitive demands, including a call for Solidarity's own radio-TV stations. []

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A small group of delegates announced the formation of a discussion club "serving independence" that wants free elections and full sovereignty for Poland. This endeavor seems unlikely to gather any significant support. []

Soviet Criticism

Moscow's commentary so far on the second session of the congress suggests that it foresees an outcome as unacceptable as was the first session. TASS claims that "counterrevolutionary" elements are operating in and around the congress and preparing new actions to interfere in the affairs of Poland's Communist neighbors--an allusion to the appeal to the workers of Eastern Europe and the USSR. []

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Quoting a claim by the Czechoslovak party newspaper that the self-dissolution of the Committee for Social Self-Defense in Poland is only a maneuver, TASS notes that leaders of the disbanded "counterrevolutionary" organization will retain their influence within Solidarity's leadership. The Soviet agency also quotes the Czechoslovak newspaper's warning of unrealistic expectations within Poland that the Solidarity congress will somehow overcome the present crisis. []

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The current commentary is doubtless intended in part to influence the deliberations of the congress, and the Soviets will probably withhold their final judgment until the congress announces its major decisions. Meanwhile, Moscow is clearly preparing the ground to demand that the Polish regime resume the offensive against Solidarity and take forceful action against its more radical leaders. []

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Troop Rotation

On Monday, the Soviet Ministry of Defense published its semiannual order for the callup and release of conscripts; flights carrying personnel to and from the Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe should begin in mid-October. About one-fourth of the enlisted personnel in

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Soviet units are replaced during each troop rotation. During and after troop rotations, the preparedness of Soviet units is temporarily reduced. [REDACTED]

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Satellite photography since Monday shows that tents are still pitched at one Polish unit in Warsaw--indicating that it may remain at augmented strength--but no unusual activity was seen at other Polish units or at several divisions in the western USSR. [REDACTED]

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USSR-CUBA: Arrival of Frigate

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The Cuban Navy has taken delivery of its first Soviet-built Koni-class frigate. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] It will be the largest warship in the Cuban Navy and probably will be used to show the flag throughout the Caribbean. The frigate, built for export purposes, carries SA-N-4 surface-to-air missiles, antisubmarine rockets, and guns. Algeria, Yugoslavia, and East Germany also have received Koni-class ships. [REDACTED]

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

Egypt: Nuclear Program

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Egypt has developed an ambitious nuclear program since its ratification in February of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Egyptian decisionmakers probably believe that by ratifying the treaty and embarking on a major nuclear power program, they can help solve future domestic energy problems and strengthen Egypt's position as a major regional power. Ratification will facilitate the acquisition, under appropriate safeguards, of the power reactors which Egypt has announced it is seeking as well as of additional basic nuclear research facilities.

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The Egyptians have only a small Soviet-built research reactor, but they have plans for an ambitious nuclear power program that calls for eight nuclear power reactors operating by the end of this century. Following a US offer to sell nuclear power plants to both Egypt and Israel in 1974, intermittent discussions with Egypt resulted in a US-Egypt nuclear cooperation agreement last June. Since ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Egyptians have begun discussions for the purchase of reactors from West Germany, France, and other countries.

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Resources and Objectives

Egypt has some of the resources it needs to expand its nuclear power program, including a large group of nuclear scientists and recently discovered but unevaluated uranium ore deposits. Furthermore, the Egyptians have announced they will earmark \$500 million annually from future oil revenues for alternate energy purposes, primarily nuclear power. The soft oil market, however, is likely to delay the start of this scheme.

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As part of an effort to improve its basic nuclear research capabilities, Egypt has sought hot cells and waste treatment technology. We have no evidence these

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research capabilities are for anything beyond peaceful purposes, but sophisticated technology and experience in the nuclear energy field could eventually provide Egypt with some of the requisite skills for nuclear weapons development if a political decision were to be made in Cairo to pursue such a program. [REDACTED]

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Nuclear weapons development activity in the Middle East has brought increasing concern to Cairo. If Egypt should make the costly political decision to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and abrogate its existing treaty obligations, it probably could not do so before the 1990s. [REDACTED]

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Political Considerations

Egypt has long sought to gain UN endorsement of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East and was one of the original signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Until this year, however, Egypt had refused to ratify the treaty unless Israel did. [REDACTED]

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Although we believe the Egyptians ratified the treaty primarily to meet its energy needs--they expected it would afford them greater access to alternate sources of energy supplies and financing--the treaty also provides a political lever to use in promoting a nuclear-weapons-free zone. In announcing its ratification, Cairo urged the nuclear weapons states to make progress on nuclear disarmament issues. [REDACTED]

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Cairo probably also recognizes the greater access it will have to nuclear technology now that it is a party to the treaty. Shortly after Egypt ratified it, the semiofficial Egyptian newspaper *Al-Ahram* noted in a major editorial that ratification "will strengthen Egypt's nuclear option in the future" and argued that both Libya and Iraq gained access to nuclear technology after they ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [REDACTED]

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